The following study is devoted to the problem of prevention harmful missions led by small offensive Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The main goal of the report is to familiarize the reader with a general methodology for counteracting offensive UAV. In this report the authors state that counter UAV methodology comprise of several stages: threats identification, preparation to prevention, active counteracting, evaluation and improvement of the anti-UAV counteraction system. In recommendations, the authors describe two non-excluding practical approaches to countering hostile UAVs: offensive counter UAV and defensive counter UAV. Which concern with two different criteria: to destroy as many UAV as possible and to protect high value assets from threats of UAVs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of combat UAV (UCAV) caused changes in its mission roles, which began to combine tactics of manned reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. From Reconnaissance, they evolved to Strike and CAS (Close Air Support). UCAVs now can execute even On-Call CAS [1] .
The pioneer in the operation of UCAV was Israel [2] . For now, USA, Great Britain, Germany, France and China have the significant experience of developing and deploying UCAV. Every year more and more countries are involved in this field, including Turkey, Poland, Ukraine, etc.
During Russian hybrid war against Ukraine laсk of experience to fight UAVs becomes obvious. While the counteraction to MALE and HALE UAV can be done in the global air defense system, to cope with small UAVs with such means is currently economic inefficient.
The way to increase efficiency of anti UAV protection is to develop proper agile counter-UAV subsystem in the state AD system can define. So, the paper's aim is to give some insights for those who will be creating such subsystem and to design kind of "Roadmap" for it.
II. COUNTER UAV GENERAL APPROACH
Counter UAV methodology shown on Fig. 1 [3] : a) To identify and distinguish threats to the protected object. Besides of analyzing own vulnerabilities and risks, it is necessary to create model of offender's goals and courses of action.
b) Preparation to threat concerning its prevention: concealment, protection and defense own objects; training of personnel; search for the best solutions. c) Active countermeasures include activities such as detection, tracking, identification, evaluation, decision making and counteraction. d) Evaluation and improvement of the anti-UAV counteraction system.
III. DETECTION OF UAV
The main problem in combating UAV is to detect targets and the fact of their presence. Indeed, the current level of UAVs' production technology (used in the construction of plastic, fiberglass, foam, etc.) can provide radar cross-section values from 0.005 to 0.1 m 2 , and the use of low-power economic engines makes flight almost silent, which greatly complicates the process of detection, identifying and tracking.
Detection of UAVs can be passive (radio, acoustic, builtin opto-electronic means on anti-aircraft installations, air visual surveillance posts), as well as active (radars).
Detection of electronic equipment of the UAV, determination of its frequency ranges should be carried out by ground-based electronic intelligence systems. Such systems should complement the artillery reconnaissance and observation, substantially increasing the intelligence capabilities of the overall system for improving the quality of interaction organization and exchange of intelligence. The culmination of detection stage should be the tracking process, during which UAV is identified and is assessed for threats presence. In result of threat level evaluation should be making the decision on appropriate counteraction to offensive UAV. 
IV. COUNTERACTION TO OFFENSIVE UAV
There are several ways to prevent negative effects from offensive UAVs. They can be: destructive and nondestructive (hard and soft), kinetic / nonkinetic destruction of UAV and/or signal repeater and / or ground control station (GCS), with/without interception of UAV / information, information (cyber) influence, etc.
The most obvious method is physical destruction. Various weapons can be used for it. Thus, small lightweights can be shot down with the help of small arms, anti-aircraft artillery, and it is expedient to use anti-aircraft missile systems to defeat large UAVs. Leading countries of the world are creating EMI, microwave, laser, as well as the conventional weapon [4] , [5], [6] , to destruct offensive UAVs.
Such results are fast but physical damages of hostile UAV prevent us from revealing of its intended mission. So, the next method, Interception, is free from this disadvantage. Physical access to the captured UAV gives opportunity to disclose the foe's intentions.
Interception can be "hard" or "soft". "Hard" means physical impact on the hostile UAV to make it lands in our area of responsibility. This could be performed by UAVinterceptor or even by trained bird of prey [7] , [8] , [9] . "Soft" is cyber or electronic impact, as it is described below.
Interference with electronic equipment (jamming) is another significant approach. As an alternative to the physical destruction, suppression of UAV's electronic systems can make offensive UAV to land or to fall down. Some modern UAVs have the ability to independently perform some of tasks, but still almost all UAVs have been operated by the remote pilot, and the commands are transmitted over the radio channel. Thus, the suppression of the control channel by means of electronic warfare (EW) can, at least, hinder hostile task execution. Currently, it is not a common practice to equip UAV with intelligent autopilot, capable of taking control in case of loss of signal from the operator. In addition, the loss of communication with the operator will result in the inability to transmit intelligence information, such as a video signal.
In case of loss of communication with the operator, some UAVs have the appropriate mode of operation. When the signal from the remote control is lost, the automation returns the UAV to a designated area where it can make a landing. In this case, the control system ignores all signals, and the movement to the specified area is carried out using satellite navigation. In order to prevent the "evacuation" of UAV, the means of EW should suppress not only the control channel, but also the signals of the navigation system.
As a result of the successful "jamming" of all these signals, the foe, with high probability, will lost the equipment that has appeared in the area of the EW, with all its information (intelligent). There are a lot of modern examples of such "soft" weapon [10] , [11] .
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
According to the have been sad above, it is necessary to distinguish two nonexcluding practical approaches to countering hostile UAVs: offensive counter UAV and defensive counter UAV. Which concern with two different strategies: to destroy as many UAV as it is possible and to protect high value assets from threats of UAVs.
Offensive counteraction -Destroying UAVs. The high price of the counteraction to small UAV by area defense missile systems necessitate the development and implementation of special measures, both for their physical destruction and for counteraction to the intelligence, control and weapon UAV on-board systems. Such a list of measures may include:
 creation of special groups of air-defense units, which include various types of short-range SAM systems, forward area air defense gun system, MANPADS, which have relatively high intelligence and fire capabilities for small-scale targets and exclusively UAVs;
 modernization of existing anti-aircraft weapons assets in order to increase their effectiveness on small-scale targets;
 development of sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons designed to solve specific problems of detecting and defeating small-scale air targets, including UAVs (drones);
 development of specialized equipment for splashing small-scale air targets, based on unconventional ways of destruction and weapons on new physical principles;  creating the system of military measures to counteract intelligence and control systems, reducing effectiveness of hostile UAVs' mission.
For the effective counteraction to small-scale air targets, it is necessary to create a purposeful counteraction system (as part of the overall AD system), which should include an active component (damage to the UAV) and passive component (measures to counteract intelligence and control systems, and to reduce the UAV-mission effectiveness).
Destruction of the ground component unmanned aerial system (UAS), such as GCS, launch and maintenance sites, may be carried out by artillery and attack aircrafts. Since the launch sites of small-scale UAV are forced to be deployed directly near the forward edge of battle area, they must be destroyed by fire units as high priority target.
Destruction of elements of the UAS at their deployment sites should also be carried out by Special Operation Forces. An important part of this mission is also to find out the locations of UAS units, their strength, plans, and technical characteristics of GCS. Such measures are carried out both by technical means of ISR and by covert intelligence. Performing the task of destroying ground elements of UAS, in order to prevent the launch of the UAV, becomes particularly relevant due to the lack of efficiency of all other means of reacting to UAVs with low reflection surface.
In order to defeat the UAV by fire or by any other means in the air, an anti-aircraft missile (artillery) fire system must be thoroughly organized, and it can only become effective if a series of special measures are taken in response to smallscale air targets. It should be created as a part of a common unified air defense system as a special subsystem of air defense to small-scale targets. Such targets include not only UAVs but also high-precision weapons (guided bombs, cruise missiles, etc.).
The subsystem of air defense to small-scale targets should include elements of ISR and warning systems, combat operations management, anti-aircraft missile and artillery fire systems, and so on.
The tasks of detection, tracking and dissemination of information should be solved by all ISR units, concerning with network-centered warfare strategy.
Naturally, for the improvement efficiency of search and detection of small-scale UAVs, it is necessary to use a set of tools on diverse physical principles. The detection of such UAVs should be carried out by passive means of ISR (radio, optic, acoustic), as well as active means (radar). As it is reads higher, anti-aircraft searchlights and network of visual observation posts may come in handy.
It should be noted that the active defeat of the smallscale UAV by anti-aircraft means, that are on the service, is possible only with great limitations for the detection and fire on a UAV with a reflection surface of less than 0.01 m 2 . Effective targeting of UAV which has less reflection surface with ongoing anti-aircraft systems is practically impossible.
For reliable damage to the micro-UAV it is necessary to develop specialized anti-aircraft weapon systems, based on new physical principles (laser, EMP, etc.).
Defensive counteraction -High Value Asset (HVA)
Protection should be carried out in the general air defense system. Which the main criterion of efficiency should be distorted damage to protected object.
Evaluation of capabilities of ongoing anti-aircraft means for active reaction to small UAV shows the following. Command posts ISR means of military units, which must provide anti-aircraft systems with time-sensitive information on the coordinates of air targets, when working on smallscale UAVs are ineffective. Detection range does not allow the higher-level staffs to participate in the fire control of subordinate units, which significantly reduces the potential combat capabilities as a whole, so, decision must be carried out autonomously.
However, separate fire units, in the case of counteraction to small-scale air targets, have similar problems, which are caused by the specifics of the construction and UAV-led missions. So, the effective damage to the UAV in the air is extremely complicated.
In order to solve this problem, it is proposed to create mobile mixed anti-aircraft groups (MMAAGs), that should apply different principles for detecting airborne attacks, tracking and shooting down small-scaled air target. The main idea is to combine the properties of the various existing detection systems, guiding, SAM and anti-aircraft artillery means of various types in order to compensate the disadvantages of some by the advantages of others.
Separate fire units of such groups can act at the most dangerous flight areas of UAV as moving ambushes among set of HVAs. This achieves the surprise of air defense fire and increases the effectiveness as of HVA's protection so of damage to small-scale UAVs.
In such groups, ROE and guidelines for interaction in the fire system of the small-scale UAVs counteraction should be pre-designed in advance. These instructions should specify the procedure for conducting detection, tracking, identification and elimination of UAV, the exchange of information between the anti-aircraft units.
Hitting area of MMAAGs must be comprised in such a way that sectors of active and passive anti-aircraft weapons are superimposed for the possibility of firing one target with anti-aircraft weapons that use different methods and techniques of target targeting and EW interference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Thus, the decision which approach (offensive, defensive or their combination) to the termination of foe's hostile action best fit to the situation depends on the available resources, such us time, weapons, and personnel.
At present, to counteract the UAV, as well as physical destruction of UAVs is necessary, also it is necessary to carry out a set of organizational measures aimed at misleading the enemy regarding the actual position of troops in combat positions, as much as possible to reduce the possibility of aerial ISR, determination technical characteristics of radio emitting of its electronic equipment, etc. To such organizational measures that need to be carried out in the troops, it should be attributed:  using different ways to camouflaging and shielding high value assets (such as the use of smoke and masking aerosols;
 skillful use of protective features of the terrain by troops and military units; the application of mirror material particles to the roofs of buildings and vehicles to create obstacles for the optical devices of the UAV [12] );
 creation of a system of high value assets decoys;
 restriction or prohibition of the use of wireless communication, mobile phones and active GPS devices, etc.
Modern active countermeasures must provide the usage of effectors ("hard kill capabilities") like programmable air burst munition and high energy laser systems.
For effective use of the "soft and hard kill capabilities", sensors must meet the following main requirements:
 be capable of rapid detection and warn of UAV at military significant ranges with low false alarm rate;
 guarantee high reliability of threat identification;
 provide target designation that fulfil requirements of effectors [13] .
The approach given in the article is roadmap, the first step, to countering modern and future UAV tactics, such as their group, swarm and intellectual deployment [11] , [14] .
